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ABSTRACT 
 
Novel Applications of Data Mining Methodologies to Incident Databases. 
 (May 2005) 
Sumit Anand, B.E., Regional Engineering College, Rourkela, India 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sam Mannan 
 
Incident databases provide an excellent opportunity to study the repeated situations of 
incidents in the process industry. The databases give an insight into the situation which 
led to an incident, and if studied properly can help monitor the process, equipment and 
chemical involved more closely, and reduce the number of incidents in the future. This 
study examined a subset of incidents from National Response Center’s Incident 
database, focusing mainly on fixed facility incidents in Harris County, Texas from 1990 
to 2002. 
 
Data mining has been used in the financial and marketing arena for many decades to 
analyze and find patterns in large amounts of data. Realizing the limited capabilities of 
traditional methods of statistics, more robust techniques of data mining were applied to 
the subset of data and interesting patterns of chemical involved, equipment failed, 
component involved, etc. were found. Further, patterns obtained by data mining on the 
subset of data were used in modifying probabilities of failure of equipment and 
developing a decision support system. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Incidents have been ubiquitous in the chemical process industry and can often be 
attributed to different natures. It may be an incident with release of a small quantity of 
chemical with no injury, property damage, or loss of production. On the other hand it 
may be an incident like the unfortunate Bhopal tragedy, leading to the release of deadly 
methyl iso-cyanate which resulted in the loss of 3000 innocent civilians and injuring at 
least 100,000 people [1]. 
 
 “An incident is defined as the sudden unintended release of or exposure to a hazardous 
substance that results in or might reasonably have resulted in, deaths, injuries, significant 
property or environmental damage, evacuation or sheltering in place [2].”  
 
The same report that gives the above definition defines the hazardous material as given 
below 
 
 “A hazardous material is defined as any chemical, including a petroleum product that is 
toxic, reactive, flammable, asphyxiating, or that presents a potential hazard to people, the 
environment, or property because of pressure or temperature [2].” 
 
With an increase in the number and intensity of incidents since the 1970s, process safety 
has gained a significant importance in everyday operations of the process industry [3].  
Apart from the watershed event in Bhopal, some of the other major disasters the 
chemical process industry has seen, are given below 
 
This thesis follows the style of Process Safety Progress. 
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• Flixborough, England - It occurred in June 1974 with an explosion of thirty tons 
of cyclohexane vapor leveling the entire facility. Twenty-eight people were killed 
and thirty six injured in the facility. Another fifty-three civilians were injured [3]. 
• Pasadena, Texas – An explosion occurred in Texas in 1989 which resulted in 
twenty three fatalities, three hundred and fourteen injuries and extensive capital 
loss. The explosion followed the release of eighty five thousand pounds of 
flammable mixture comprising of ethylene, isobutene, hexane, and hydrogen [3]. 
• Mexico City, Mexico – It occurred in 1984, at San Juan Ixhautepec, outside 
Mexico City, Mexico. A series of BLEVEs (Boiling liquid expanding vapor 
explosion) took place due to rupture of a pipeline at an LPG terminal facility. 
The flammable vapor reached a flare stack and caused the first explosion. This 
propagated more BLEVEs causing total disruption of the facility and death of 
five hundred people [1]. 
• Seveso, Italy – It occurred in Seveso in 1976, a  small town 15 miles from Milan, 
Italy with a release of 3000 kg of chemicals. These chemicals included unknown 
quantity of dioxin and 2 kgs of 2, 3, 7, 8- tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin. The 
incident did not cause any immediate casualties, however thirty-seven-thousand 
people were exposed to chemical and roughly eighty-thousand animals died [1]. 
• Piper Alpha – This incident occurred on an offshore platform in 1988, at Piper 
alpha oil production platform in the North Sea. It involved explosion of one of 
the modules of the production deck. It led to a large pool of fire and smoke on 
the adjacent modules and the accommodation modules. One hundred and sixty 
seven people died in one of the worst accident that occurred on an offshore 
platform [4]. 
 
1.2. Incident Pyramid 
 
Incidents in the process industry normally follow a pattern in the form of a pyramid as 
shown in Figure 1. The incident pyramid or safety pyramid typically demonstrates that 
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there are a large number of incidents with errors and deviations and the number of 
incidents decreases as one goes up in the pyramid with the consequences as listed. There 
are a large number of incidents at the bottom of the pyramid which do not result in any 
property damage or even the loss of production. Near - miss incidents are incidents 
which could have led to damaging consequences but in reality did not lead to any of 
those [5]. A typical example of a near-miss case is release of a chemical due to opening 
of a safety relief valve without any damaging consequences [5]. At the top of the 
pyramid there are incidents which result in human injury or even fatality with extensive 
property damage and loss of production.  
 
 
 
Near- miss incidents are an eye-opener for any organization to determine the cause of a 
problem and to correct it before it leads to a serious accident. Focusing on these 
incidents and reducing their number can shrink the incident pyramid. This reduces the 
number of more serious accidents at the top of the pyramid leading to injuries and 
fatalities.  
 
Errors and Deviations 
Unsafe behavior and/or acts 
Near-Miss Events 
Minor Injuries
Serious Injuries
Fatal Incidents 
Figure 1. Incident pyramid [5] 
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1.3. Process Safety Management 
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), one of the government 
organizations, is responsible for creating regulations and standards. OSHA conducts 
inspections and issues citations when safety and health violations occur [3]. In 1992, 
OSHA promulgated “Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals” [3]. 
Process safety management, one of the important concerns of OSHA, was developed 
after the Bhopal incident in 1984. It is recognized nationwide as a regulation towards 
preventing and reducing the number and magnitude of incidents [3]. 
 
The PSM standard consists of 14 major elements: 
 
1. Employee Participation 
2. Process Safety Information 
3. Process Hazard Analysis 
4. Operating Procedures 
5. Training 
6. Contractors 
7. Pre-startup Safety Review 
8. Mechanical Integrity 
9. Hot Work Permit 
10. Management of Change 
11. Incident Investigation 
12. Emergency Planning and Response 
13. Audits 
14. Trade Secrets 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
1.4. Incident Investigation 
 
Incident investigation is one of the elements in PSM. Incident investigation follows a 
problem solving methodology that includes accumulating all the information and 
evidence about an incident, analyzing all the initial data collected, and documenting the 
conclusions and findings [5].  
 
The extent of investigation basically depends on the intensity of the incident. 
Investigations done on the incidents can be a useful feedback to the industry personnel, 
determining the root cause of the incident. Root cause of an incident can be related to 
any of the elements of PSM as listed above [5]. 
 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) categorizes incident investigation into 
three basic techniques: 
 
 1. Deductive 
 2. Inductive 
 3. Morphological  
 
Deductive Technique 
This approach involves finding the cause of the incident from general to specific by 
proposing that a system has failed in a particular way [5]. Subsequently, an effort is 
made to determine the specific components of the system and the organization which led 
to that failure. Fault tree analysis is one of the methods followed in the deductive 
technique. The deductive approach starts from the time the incident occurred and looks 
backward in time to scrutinize earlier events [5]. 
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Inductive Technique 
This includes analyzing the incident from certain cases to finally coming up with 
conclusions. This technique is executed by postulating that a starting event has occurred. 
Further the consequences of the starting event are determined. Typical examples of 
inductive techniques are Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
 
Morphological Technique 
This technique does not postulate any initiating event or subsequent events rather, it 
depends heavily on the likely hazardous elements like operations, situations, past 
deviations, and other factors from past experience of the individuals [5]. Some of the 
commonly practiced techniques in this approach are Accident Evolution and Barrier 
Technique and Work Safety Analysis. 
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CHAPTER II 
INCIDENT DATABASES 
 
2.1. Background 
 
Proper documentation of the investigation of incidents is necessary. Incident databases 
have been in existence for more than three decades now.  These databases have come a 
long way and have become more complex and powerful having incorporated the 
relational nature in them [6]. The databases have enormous data in them which if 
properly explored [7], can identify the greatest risk concerning certain chemicals, types 
of equipment involved, and types of processes. This can further help to use the resources 
of several Federal Agencies and the Emergency Responders more efficiently. It can also 
help in better industrial safety performance assessment and identification of trends [8]. 
These databases help the design engineers and personnel involved with operations and 
maintenance in a facility concentrate on issues on safety which are related to their 
domain of work. These databases also bring to the notice of the upper management the 
issues related to safety in their respective departments and they tend to be more receptive 
towards those concerns.  
 
A brief summary of the various incident databases is discussed in this chapter with the 
major attributes of an incident that are mentioned in the particular database and the 
strengths and weaknesses of the database. 
 
2.2. National Fire Information Reporting System (NFIRS) Database 
 
The US Fire Administration maintains the NFIRS database [9]. Around 40% of the 
29,000 fire departments and about 6,900 emergency departments currently report to the 
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NFIRS database. 42 states are actively involved in this process. Events are reported in 
which fire and emergency departments are involved. Departments report directly to the 
system, or they can also report to the state fire marshal, from where it is then sent to 
NFIRS. 
 
Major attributes of an incident in this database are as follows: 
• Date and time 
• Location 
• Chemical or any other material involved 
• Consequences 
• Estimation of damage 
• Fire and the emergency department details 
• Location categories 
• Type of equipment involved 
• Number of emergency personnel present at the site 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
The strengths of this database are that it is able to capture a large amount of data and has 
a complete location code. It also includes information on damage estimation. The major 
drawback with this database is that it fails to account for significant incidents and is not 
comprehensive enough. 
 
2.3. National Electronic Injuries Surveillance System (NEISS) 
 
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) operates this injury 
surveillance system known as the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System 
(NEISS) [10]. NEISS provides data on consumer product-related injuries in the U.S. 
CPSC primarily concentrates on consumers from defective products. NEISS is highly 
subjective towards injuries caused by mechanical failures. The data accumulation 
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process starts when a patient is admitted to the emergency department of a NEISS 
hospital. An emergency department staff member brings forth information on the 
occurrence of injury and enters that into record. At a later stage all emergency 
department records for the day are reviewed and those that meet the current criteria for 
inclusion in NEISS are selected. The CPSC extrapolates records collected from hospital 
emergency rooms across the country. The CPSC also collects data from death 
certificates, other regulatory agencies, news reports, and consumer reports. 
 
Major attributes of an incident in this database are as follows: 
• Date  
• Incident description 
• Product  
• Consequences 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
One of the strong points of this database is experts collect the data .Text is available and 
this database is statistically valid and can be extrapolated. One of the drawbacks with 
this database is time and location of the incident is not mentioned which causes 
duplications in certain cases.  
 
2.4. News Clipping Database 
 
The Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University maintains a 
News Clipping Database. This database is a collection of incidents from newspaper 
databases.  
 
Following is a list of sources: 
1. “Pay-Per-View” Archival Services 
• NewsLibrary.com 
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• NorthernLight.com 
2. Free – Real Time sources 
• Google  
• AltaVista 
 
The sources present a short description of the clipping. Cases that are of interest are 
purchased or downloaded from the Web. For 1998 information was extracted from the 
sources and entered into the News Clipping database. The free real-time sources gather 
articles from a much larger number of sources but only retain information for about 30 
days.  Google searches more than 4,000 sources. 
 
Following are the attributes of the incidents in the MKOPSC database: 
• Name of facility, company, or dealer 
• Address of the company or involved facility 
• Date  
• Fatalities, evacuations, injuries, hospitalizations, and sheltering 
• Distribution of the consequences listed above among employees, contractors, 
and general public 
• Number of response units in the incident site 
• Location of the release 
• Nature of release 
• Cause of the incident 
• Material involved 
• State of material released 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
The news clipping procedure has several strengths such as real-time information that can 
be used to summarize incidents. The name of the local responder or correspondent is 
often available. It allows direct contact that can be used to obtain investigative 
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information.  Text description of the exact incident is available. Important incidents 
receive appropriate attention. This database has near- miss incidents as well. At the same 
time this database has its own shortcomings like information can be inaccurate or 
ambiguous, some of the sources retain the information for a short period of time. 
Extensive human resources are required for converting news clipping to electronic 
format. 
 
2.5. Hazardous Material Incidents Reporting System (HMIRS) 
 
The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) established the Hazardous 
Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) in 1971 to accomplish the requirements 
of the federal hazardous materials transportation regulation [11]. 
 
All spills meeting the following criteria are reported to the RSPA: 
• As a direct result of hazardous materials any of the following happens 
? A person gets killed or gets injured badly  
? Property damage exceeds $50,000 
? Evacuation of general public lasts for more than one hour 
? Major transport artery or facility is closed for more than one hour 
? Rerouting of an aircraft is required 
• Fire, spillage, and contamination involving shipment of radioactive materials. 
• There is a release of a pollutant in a water body exceeding 450 liters  
• Any hazardous material is inadvertently released or any quantity of hazardous 
waste is spilled during transportation. 
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All modes of transportation are included except pipeline and bulk marine transportation. 
The incidents are to be reported by the carrier’s owner. 
 
There are 114 fields in the database .Major attributes of an incident in the database are as 
follows: 
• Carriers’ information 
• Carriers’ Damage 
• Incident Cause 
• Product 
• Destination 
• Fires, explosions, or other consequences 
• Decontamination costs 
• Loss of Product costs 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
Information is comprehensive as it is mandatory for the carriers to report within 30 days 
and they are well-informed about their business. Data for the incidents where 
consequences are below thresholds is not provided. 
 
2.6. Integrated Pipeline Information System (IPIS)  
 
IPIS is also called as Hazardous Liquid Accident Data and it contains releases of 
petroleum and its byproducts that meet reporting requirements as outlined in 49 CFR 
Parts 191, 192, and 195 [12]. The Hazardous Liquid Accident Data does not include 
incidents involving natural gas. Incident reports are to be submitted to the Office of 
Pipeline Safety by the accountable operators within 30 days of the incident to avoid 
fines.  
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There are 62 fields in the database. Some of the important attributes of an incident in this 
database are given below: 
• Information on operator 
• Date and time of incident 
• Location 
• Origin of release (e.g., valve, trap, pump, welding, girth, flange, seal, etc.) 
• Pipeline production year 
• Operating information 
• Cause of incident 
• Injuries and fatalities of employees and non-employees 
• Total property damage involved 
• Commodity classification 
• Fire/explosion involved 
• Corrosion information 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
Data accuracy is increased since the incidents are reported by industry people. Most of 
the incidents that meet the reporting requirement are submitted. Incidents under the 
reporting thresholds are not captured.   
 
2.7. Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) Database 
 
IRIS contains data on reported releases from fixed facilities, marine, offshore facilities, 
pipelines, and transportation vehicles. Many federal statutes require reporting of releases 
to the National Response Center (NRC). The NRC basically comprises of Coast Guard 
personnel who maintain a 24 hour per day, 7 days a week round the year telephone 
watch. NRC personnel who keep a watch on the incidents record telephonic information 
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of incidents into the Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) and further send the 
reports to Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) [13]. Pipeline spills are reported under 
the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act. 
 
Air releases are reported under: 
• Clean Air Act 
• Toxic Substances Control Act 
• Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Laws 
• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
 
NRC database has 10 tables with over 200 fields covering a gamut of attributes of 
different incidents reporting all oil, chemical, radiological, biological, and etiological 
discharges into the environment anywhere in the United States and its territories [13].  
 
Some of the major attributes of an incident in the NRC database are given below: 
• Date and time of an incident 
• Nature of the incident 
• A brief description of the incident 
• Incident Cause 
• Remedial Action taken 
• Chemical released 
• Amount released 
• Evacuations 
• Injuries  
• Fatalities involved 
 
In addition to all these fields for every incident in the database, NRC also has specific 
information related to the nature of incident whether it is related to fixed facilities, 
pipelines, and other transportation modes.  
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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
The law mandates that every incident of chemical release (above reportable quantity) to 
the environment should be reported to the National Response Center [14]. NRC captures 
all these incidents and the database is considered to be quite comprehensive. NRC 
handles approximately 30,000 telephone calls each year, of which approximately 25,000 
are unique incidents. Because this system contains initial reports, the information is 
preliminary and therefore in many cases inaccurate or incomplete. There also is 
duplicate reporting of incidents as updates to earlier reported incidents. In many cases, 
drills are reported as real incidents. 
 
2.8. RMP 5-year Accident History Database 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is mainly responsible for maintaining 
this database [15]. Risk Management Program covers stationary facilities that use, store, 
or manufacture certain chemicals above a threshold quantity. Incidents at the RMP-
covered facilities that lead to fatalities, injuries, or environmental and property damage, 
are required to be reported to the 5-year accident history database.  
 
RMP facility must provide EPA with the following information for each incident: 
• Date and time of an incident 
• Approximate duration of the release 
• Chemical released 
• Quantity of the chemical released in pounds 
• Source of release event and its type 
• Weather conditions 
• Onsite impacts 
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• Off-site impacts, if known 
• Initiating event and other contributing factors, if known 
• Off-site responders notification, if known 
• Operational or process changes that resulted from investigation of the release 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
Records are accurate as reporters are skilled in incident investigation. The reports 
mention the causes and consequences of the release and steps taken to prevent or 
mitigate future incidents.  
 
2.9. Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) Database 
 
This database is maintained by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR) [16]. Sixteen state health departments actively participate with ATSDR in 
developing and maintaining the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance 
(HSEES) system. The state health departments report an “event” if it meets the HSEES 
definition, which is “any release(s) or threatened release(s) of at least one hazardous 
substance” [15]. Data is entered by participating state health departments into a Web 
application that makes possible for the ATSDR to access data for analysis. 
 
Attributes of an incident in the database are as follows: 
• Time and date of the incident 
• Exact geographical location within the facility where the incident occurred 
• Type of incident (fixed-facility or transportation-related) 
• Inherent factors involved contributing to the release 
• Environmental sampling and follow-up health activities 
• Specific information on injured persons: age, sex, extent of injuries, distance 
from spill,  and group of people involved (employee, general public, responder, 
student)  
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• Type of protective equipment used 
• Remedial action 
• Evacuation 
• Land use and population information to estimate the number of persons present 
in the area who were potentially exposed 
• Type of contingency plan followed  
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Database 
ATSDR has a very active approach to incident data gathering that makes possible more 
comprehensive and precise reporting. This database has details about the kind of injury 
involved in an incident and personal protective equipment (PPE).Only 16 states are 
currently participating in the ATSDR HSEES program. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHALLENGES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this study a subset of the National Response Center’s database Incident Reporting and 
Information System (IRIS) was selected. There are a large number of chemical process 
industries including oil and gas, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical facilities located in 
and around Houston, Texas. The high density of facilities combined with post - 9/11 
terrorism concerns provided the impetus for studying the incidents from fixed facilities 
in Harris County, Texas from 1990 to 2002 for the case study.  
 
The challenges faced initially in selecting and transforming the variables presented in 
this subset of the database are discussed in this chapter. 
 
3.2. Types of Variables 
 
Normally there are three types of variables (data types) usually seen in any kind of data 
analysis as described below: 
 
Continuous Variables  
The value is numeric and is in a continuous form. For example, in the case of incident 
databases, the amount of chemical released in an incident can be considered as a 
continuous variable. 
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Ordinal Variables 
The values can be numeric or character. They are discrete categorical values that have an 
order. If the values are numbers, the order is the numeric magnitude. For example, the 
date an incident occurred, or the time of the incident can be termed as ordinal data in 
incident databases. 
 
Nominal Variables 
The values can be numeric or character but they do not have any implicit order among 
themselves. For example: Type of equipment units in a process plant, different causes of 
incidents, and different types of operations during which an incident occurred. 
 
The significant variables in the NRC database which are of concern for incident 
investigation are nominal in nature. For example: cause of an incident, type of 
equipment failed, the failed component, even different groups or individual chemicals 
involved in an incident, and many more. Proper transformations and methodologies are 
required to extract knowledge from nominal data. 
 
3.3. Identification of Important Variables 
 
The important variables present in the NRC database which were used directly in data 
analysis without any transformations were: 
 
1. Cause of an incident 
2. Date of the incident for trend analysis 
3. Chemical released 
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Description of the incident and the remedial action taken was useful in determining the 
type of equipment failure involved and the failed component. In limited number of cases 
even the type of operation involved during the incident could be determined. Another 
important variable mentioned in this database was whether a particular incident was 
known to the facility from the very moment the incident initiated or the incident was 
discovered by means of alarm systems or an employee noticing it. This is an important 
variable from the perspective of knowing which types of equipments or processes 
require better monitoring. 
 
3.4. Cleaning, Transformations and Categorization of Variables 
 
NRC database has its own shortcomings with repetitions, updates and drills being 
mentioned as individual incidents. A large number of residential fires, spills by vehicles, 
and incidents at private residences are mentioned as fixed facility incidents in this 
database. A total of 7,718 incidents initially given in the database as fixed facility 
incidents were considered and following were removed because of the reasons given 
below: 
• 182 were removed because they were updates to the earlier mentioned incidents 
or repetitions 
• 29 were removed, as they were drills 
• 23 were removed, as the quantity of the chemical released was not even close to 
the threshold and were in the units given as one drop etc.  
• 219 were removed, as these were spills from motor vehicles at gas stations and 
other incidents not at all related to chemical facilities 
 
Finally, after cleaning the file, an auxiliary field was created in the database to 
incorporate the type of equipment failure involved in an incident. An equipment 
classification taxonomy similar to the one proposed by Chung et. al [17] was used after 
incorporating changes required for the NRC database. 
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Following categories of type of equipment failure involved were created: 
1. Storage Vessel – this includes all the storage tank, drum failures in the fixed 
facilities 
2. Pipes and Fittings – this includes all the line and valve failures and the failures of 
fittings like flanges etc. 
3. Rotating Equipment – this includes all the failures associated with pumps, 
compressors, fans, blowers etc. 
4. Process Vessels – this includes all the failures of vessels like reactors, converters 
etc. 
5. Heat Transfer Equipment – this includes failures associated with equipments like 
heat exchangers, reboilers, condensers, vaporizers, evaporators, cooling towers 
etc. 
6. Flare Stack – this category was specifically introduced to include all the incidents 
that occurred due to flare upsets, pilot flame of the flares going out etc. 
7. Hoses – this category includes all the flexible pipes failures. 
8. Relief Equipment – this category includes all the safety relief valves, rupture 
disks, knockout drums, and header system failures 
9. Separation Equipment – this category includes all the failures involving 
scrubbers, strippers, absorbers, filters etc. 
10. Electrical Equipment – this category includes all failures involving transformers 
and generators. 
11. Process Units – this category was created to incorporate the uncertainty in the 
data given in the database. When the description of an incident is given as an 
upset in the unit without specifying the particular equipment or its component 
failure, this category was used.  
12. Unclassified – this category was introduced to include particular failures 
involving cranes, drilling equipment, and rail cars used in the fixed facility, as 
well as hydraulic failures. 
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There were also a number of incidents in the database where the existing information 
was not sufficient to finally conclude about the type of equipment failure involved. All 
these cases were categorized as unknown. 
 
NRC database has good information on the chemical released in a particular incident.  
Certain chemical releases were grouped into categories as follows: 
 
• releases of gasoline, diesel, transformer oil, fuel oil, and others were 
categorized as an Oil Release 
• releases of all types of acids were categorized as an Acid Release 
• releases of chemicals into the process water above the reportable thresholds 
were categorized as Contaminated Process Water 
 
NRC database has cause of an incident categorized into the following categories: 
1. Equipment Failure 
 2. Human Error 
 3. Natural phenomenon 
 4. Other  
 5. Dumping 
 6. Vandalism 
 7. Unknown 
 
Here every category is self explanatory except for the one mentioned as ‘other’. After 
exhaustive analysis of these incidents it was found that in most of these cases following 
were the type of operation: 
• Maintenance 
• Startup and Shutdown operations 
• Chemical Transfer operations 
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• Upsets in process units 
 
The original database had amount of chemical released in different units of mass and 
volume. These were all converted into uniform units of pounds. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA MINING 
 
4.1. Background 
 
Mining literally means to extract and is used in the context of mining the earth to get the 
valuable resources out of it [18]. Using the word data along with mining signifies 
discovering knowledge associated with data which did not come to notice earlier.  Data 
Mining was initially developed to meet the needs of the business community for sales, 
marketing, and customer support [19]. It is now used in many fields like the radio 
astronomy, medicine, and industrial process control [19]. Data Mining is used to find 
relations and regularities in the observed data [18]. Large amounts of data can now be 
analyzed and worked on using linear and non-linear techniques of data mining. 
 
Data mining developed due to the advancements in the following fields: 
• Multivariate and Computational Statistics  
• Computational Power  
 
Data mining is one of the steps in the process of knowledge discovery from data. The 
stepwise procedure is outlined in Figure 2. First, data has to be collected and can be from 
different sources and of different forms. The next step is to make a data warehouse 
where the original data is cleaned and the different components of data are integrated 
into a single form which is suitable for data mining. Finally, based on the integrated 
single form of data, important variables are selected, and those variables are transformed 
into suitable forms on which data mining methodologies can be finally applied to 
discover meaningful patterns which went unnoticed initially.  
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Figure 2. Steps to discover knowledge from databases 
 
4.2. An Overview of the Data Mining Methodologies  
 
Data mining consists of two sets of techniques: 
• Classical techniques  
• New generation techniques  
 
Classical Techniques 
These are the traditional techniques which include analyzing one variable at a time. 
Histograms, bar graphs, pie diagrams and frequencies are the most common tools to 
describe the data. The horizontal axis represents the variable categories and vertical axis 
represents the absolute or relative frequencies of the given variable [18]. Apart from 
these there are certain standardized techniques explained in the next page. 
 
Databases 
(Excel files/Access 
files/Flat files) 
Data Warehouse 
Patterns which give 
knowledge 
Cleaning and Integration 
 1.Selection and Transformation 
2. Data Mining 
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Regression 
When two or more variables in data are considered simultaneously regression plays an 
important role. Regression aims at finding correlation between two or more sets of 
variables. This helps in revealing following important information in a dataset: 
• Significant patterns in the database 
• Chance of an event occurring 
• Developing predictive modeling 
 
Clustering 
Cluster analysis is one of the methodologies used for grouping a given set of 
observations. The objective of this methodology is to group the data into separate groups 
that are heterogeneous from each other, while the group components are homogeneous 
among themselves [18]. A simple example of clustering is the clustering performed in a 
super mart to keep different kind of drinks. Separate grouping is done for all the juices, 
aerated drinks, beer, wines etc., because they have similar characteristics. 
 
Nearest Neighbor 
This technique is a prediction technique. In this technique in order to predict a value for 
a variable, one looks into other records with similar prediction values [20]. An example 
that can be given in this case is a person’s income and his living standard can be 
predicted by knowing the income of his neighbors.  
 
New Generation Techniques 
Incident databases contain variables which are mostly qualitative in nature. In order to 
extract knowledge from this data, next generation techniques of data mining are more 
helpful. Some of them are mentioned briefly below: 
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Decision Trees 
Decision trees recursively partition the data, based on the set of variables defined by user 
revealing major pockets of data which is extremely cumbersome process otherwise. 
Decision trees help in the exploratory analysis of data. Knowing the subtleties of data in 
consideration, one can transform the data accordingly to finally apply the right 
methodology in order to have a good analysis.  
 
Association Rules 
Association rules have been used in market basket analysis. Market basket analysis gives 
insight into the merchandise - which products tend to be purchased together and which 
are most amenable to promotion [19]. A simple example of this is placement of goods in 
a super mart, all the items which tend to be purchased in the same transaction are placed 
nearby, in order to boost the sales. The items that are purchased in the same transaction 
are determined from the large database maintained by the super marts. 
 
Neural Network 
Neural networks are used for prediction as well as descriptive analysis [20]. Neural 
networks are able to fit observed data, especially where there is incomplete information. 
They developed from the idea to emulate neurons in human brain. Efficient algorithms 
have been developed and statistical software employs these algorithms to fit multi-
dimensional databases. 
 
Three of the classical and next generation data mining methodologies are discussed in 
this chapter in detail. 
 
4.3. Regression 
 
Regression models aim at finding correlation between the target and the independent 
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variables. Multiple non-linear regression models fit independent variables to the 
dependent variable (the target) using forms similar to the form given in equation 1 [21]: 
 
mn
mm
nn XCXCXCCY •++•+•+= L21 22110       (1) 
where, 
Y is the Target value 
Xi is the ith independent variable 
Ci is the coefficient of correlation of variable Xi, and  
ni is the power value of variable Xi  
 
Both, Ci and ni are quantified by the regression model. 
The coefficient of determination R2 generally determines the quality of fit. 
SST
SSER −=12           (2) 
where 
SSE is the sum of squares of errors  
2
1
∑
=
∧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
n
i
ii yySSE          (3) 
where y is is the observed value and 
∧
y is the predicted value of the target by the model 
n is the total number of observations and i is the ith observation. 
 
SST given by equation 4 is the total corrected sum of squares, which represents the 
variation in the target values that ideally would be explained by the model 
( )∑
=
−=
n
i
ii yySST
1
2
         (4) 
where y  is the average of all the observed values of target. 
 R2 =1.0 represents perfect the fit.  
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4.4. Decision Trees 
 
As already mentioned, Decision trees partition the data into groups that can reveal 
inherent bias in the data, further it can be used for another set of analysis. The algorithm 
used in JMPTM 5.0.1.a, a business unit of SAS Inc. software which has been extensively 
used in this study, examines all the independent variables against the dependent variable 
and the likelihood chi-square statistic 2G  is calculated for all the independent variables. 
The variable giving the highest value of   2G   is used as the basis of partitioning the 
data. This partitioning continues until the data has no more independent variables to be 
partitioned. The likelihood-ratio test is a statistic for testing a null hypothesis Ho against 
an alternative hypothesis Ha. The larger the value of 2G , the more evidence there is 
against the null hypothesis [22].  
 
Considering a simple example of two variables X and Y which are categorical in nature, 
X with I and Y with J levels, thereby having IJ possible combinations of classifications. 
The actual database occurrences for levels I and J can be described in the form of a table 
called  a contingency table as having I rows for the categories of X and J columns for the 
categories of Y. A contingency table has frequency counts of outcomes [22]. Table 1 
having I rows and J columns is referred as an I-by-J (or I X J) contingency table [22]. 
 
Table 1. Contingency table.  
X/Y J1 J2 J3       -          -           -           -             -        Jn Total 
I1 n11 n12 n13     -         -           -            -             -       n1n     n1+ 
I2 n21 n22 n23     -         -          -             -             -       n2n n2+ 
- 
- 
In 
Total 
- 
- 
nn1 
n+1 
- 
- 
nn2 
n+2 
 
 -        -          -           -           -             -        - 
 -        -          -           -           -             -        -       
-        -          -           -           -             -       nnn      
-        -          -           -           -             -       n+n      
- 
- 
nn+ 
n 
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where ijn  denotes the frequency of i
th level of X and jth level of Y and the 2G based on 
the observations above is described below: 
)/log(2
1
2
ijij
I
i
J
j
ij mnnG
∧
= =
∑∑=         (5) 
where ijm
∧
 is the estimated expected frequency under the assumption of independence 
given below 
ijm
∧
 
n
nn ji ++=           (6) 
where +in  is the total frequency of i
th row given by 
∑=+
j
iji nn           (7) 
and jn+  is the total frequency of j
th column given by 
∑=+
i
ijj nn           (8) 
where the subscript ‘+’ denotes the sum over the index it replaces. 
 
Instead of frequencies if we have probabilities in a dataset, then the above equations are 
valid. In addition to that following conditions also apply: 
{ ijπ }   is the joint distribution of X and Y. The marginal distributions { +iπ } are the row 
totals for row variables and { j+π } are the column totals for column variables which 
satisfy [22]: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ === ++ 0.1ijjijjii πππ       (9) 
The above definitions are for a set of two variables. This statistic is examined for all the 
independent variables against the dependent variable at every step of data partitioning. 
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4.5. Association Rules  
 
As mentioned earlier, association rules are used to increase sales. They aim identifying 
associations among products purchased by the same customer. For example, it is 
generally seen that customers buying cereal are likely to buy milk as well. A formal 
presentation of the rule and the parameters of confidence, support, and lift which 
quantify a rule is given below. 
The general form of the rule is as follows: 
“IF event X occurs THEN event Y occurs as well, in M% of the times,  
and this pattern occurs in N% of all events in the dataset” 
where, 
 M is the Confidence, and  
 N is the Support. 
Support represents the probability that both events X and Y occurred simultaneously in 
the dataset. This value is calculated as presented in equation 10: 
  
dataset in the events ofnumber  Total
usly simultaneo occured Y and X eventsboth dataset  in the  timesofNumber S =upport        
              ( )YXP ∩=          (10) 
Confidence presents the probability that event Y will occur given that event X has 
already occurred. This value is calculated as presented in equation 11: 
( )XP
YXPonfidence )(
dataset in the events ofnumber  Total
occured has Xin which  events ofNumber 
Support C ∩=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=            (11) 
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Confidence is the conditional probability of event Y, given that event X has already 
occurred [21].  
The Lift value is the ratio of the probability that Y will occur when X occurs to the 
independent probability that Y will occur.  Lift is calculated as follows: 
      ( )( ) )(
dataset in the events ofnumber  Total
occured Yevent inwhich  events ofNumber 
Confidence
YPXP
YXPLift •
∩=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=            (12) 
  
The cereal and milk example can be used to emphasize the meaning of Lift. The value of 
Lift is the ratio between the probability that cereal will be purchased when milk is 
purchased, to the general probability that cereal will be purchased. A Lift value of one 
means that there is no difference between the probabilities that cereal will be purchased 
when milk is purchased, to the general probability that cereal will be purchased (no 
association). A Lift value that is greater than one means that when cereal is purchased it 
is more likely to be purchased with milk (positive association). However, a lift value of 
less than one means that if cereal is purchased it is less likely that milk will be purchased 
too.     
 
A proper presentation for the explanation of values of Lift is given below [18]: 
Lift>1: There exists a positive association between event X and event Y of the rule. 
Practically, if Lift =2, it is twice as likely that event Y will occur when event X occurs 
than the likelihood that event Y will occur independently. 
Lift =1: There is no association between occurrence of events X and Y. 
Practically, if Lift=1, it is neither likely nor unlikely that event Y will occur when event 
X occurs, than the likelihood that event Y will occur. In this case, X and Y are 
independent events. 
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Lift<1: There exists a negative association between event X and event Y of the rule. 
Practically, if Lift<1 it is less unlikely that event Y will occur upon occurrence of event 
X, than the likelihood that event Y will occur.  
Lift=0: Event X and event Y of the rule never occur together. 
It means event Y will never occur simultaneously with event X (X and Y are mutually 
exclusive [21]).  
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CHAPTER V 
TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF INCIDENT DATBASES 
 
5.1. Background 
 
Pattern identification, or in other words finding repeated situations in incident databases, 
has been done in the past using various techniques. This can serve as a powerful risk 
management tool. Univariate analysis of finding frequency and relative frequencies of 
certain variables like type of operation involved in an incident [23] , type of chemical 
facility involved [24] as well as others has been done in the past. Bar graphs, pie 
diagrams and frequencies are the most common ways to represent the distribution of a 
particular attribute of an incident. Trend analysis is also done to identify how the 
incident cause, types of processes, types of chemical releases, and types of equipment 
failures are distributed over a period of time. It also helps to identify any rise or fall in 
the number of incidents in certain periods of time or even with certain regulations 
coming into effect. 
 
Individual companies also maintain their own records incorporating company’s internal 
safety program and to satisfy inspectors [25]. Complete documentation is done for the 
past incidents that have led to injuries and fatalities. In other cases, several organizations 
including Federal agencies collect data on industrial incidents. However, they all vary in 
their procedures for data collection, maintaining it and finally analyzing it to achieve 
their specific objectives. In 2002, The Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at 
Texas A&M University published a report on the feasibility of using federal incident 
databases to measure and improve chemical safety [26]. 
 
Macro analysis done by McIntosh et. al [27] reveals inherently weak systems in their 
incident data and help risk managers to concentrate resources on those systems. This 
35 
 
 
study used pareto technique to focus attention to limited number of chemical releases 
and scenarios that were causing most of the incidents in their incident data. A 
comprehensive study was done by Mannan et. al [7] on how to use incident databases 
more efficiently. 
 
5.2. National Response Center, Harris County Fixed Facilities Incidents 
 
As mentioned earlier, in this study Harris county data consisting of fixed facility 
incidents from 1990 to 2002 was selected. US federal regulations require that every 
incident of chemical release (above reportable quantity) should be reported to the 
National Response Center [1]. In spite of this, NRC data is inaccurate, as it does not 
include all the incidents occurring at the fixed facilities. In fact the number reported to 
NRC is much less than the actual number of incidents, primarily because the incidents 
occurring at small and medium- sized enterprises (SME) do not get reported to NRC. 
This is due to the fact, that the SMEs do not have sufficient resources and trained 
personnel having a sound process safety background, to report the incidents. The lack of 
safety knowledge in the personnel working at these enterprises can be attributed to the 
reality that a major portion of these facilities are not covered by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration’s process safety program (PSM) regulations. 
 
Contrary to all the reasoning given above, NRC data for Harris county for fixed facility 
incidents is reasonable accurate. This is primarily because, the information about an 
incident is collected and reported by competent personnel at chemical, refinery, and 
petrochemical facilities, which are large businesses and covered by PSM. Even though, 
the information is collected very close to the time of incident, cause of the incident, 
equipment failed, chemical released and a brief discussion of the incident and the 
remedial actions taken are given which gives an excellent opportunity to analyze the 
incidents occurring in Harris County.  
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NRC data used in this study was first looked at from a traditional point of view. 
Univariate analysis was done on various attributes like incident cause, type of equipment 
failure involved, type of operation, kind of chemical released etc. using bar graphs. This 
helped in exploratory analysis of the data and further data mining methodologies were 
applied to reveal interesting patterns. 
 
5.3. Data Analysis 
 
Figure 3 represents distribution of the number of incidents based on the cause of 
incidents in Harris County from 1990 to 2002. From the figure it can be said that the 
majority of incidents occurred due to equipment failure. A large number of incidents had 
insufficient information and cause of the incident could not be concluded. Moreover, the 
information was also inadequate to categorize further the broad categories of cause 
involved, shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of number of incidents by cause (Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
 
Patterns were also found in the database on the basis of type of equipment failure 
involved in incidents as given in Figure 4. It can be concluded that the most failed 
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equipment involved storage vessels, pipes and fittings, rotating equipment, etc. Electrical 
equipment and the separation equipment failures were least involved in incidents. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of number of incidents by the type of equipment involved 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
 
 
A distribution was worked out to find the particular incident causes that were associated 
with certain equipment failures in Figure 5. This distribution revealed that certain 
incident causes were associated with certain type of equipment failures more than others. 
For example, human error was mostly associated with equipment failures like storage 
vessels, pipes and fittings, process vessels, flexible pipes and process units. Similarly, 
natural phenomenon like heavy rainfall, lightning, storm and other inclement weather 
conditions resulted in storage vessel, separation equipment, stack and rotating equipment 
failures. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of number of incidents with incident cause and equipment involved (Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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In Figure 6, a distribution of the number of incidents was done for incidents which had 
sufficient information about the particular component failures associated with 
equipments. The components mainly examined were seals, gaskets and flanges. Out of 
the 7,265 incidents 572 occurred due to failures of seals, gaskets and flanges. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of number of incidents by components of equipment  
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
 
For further analysis, all the flange failures were grouped into a separate category as the primary 
function of flanges is different from seals and gaskets. Selected categories of equipments 
involving majority of incidents were examined and the distribution was found as shown in 
Figure 7. This figure illustrates that a major number of incidents involving seal and gasket 
failures were associated with rotating equipment, pipe and fitting, process vessel, and storage 
vessel but not other equipments. 
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Figure 7.  Distribution of number of incidents for seals, gaskets and flanges failures. 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
 
There were 504 incidents which had their incident cause mentioned as ‘Other’ in the 
database. These 504 incidents were reviewed closely, and it revealed that the type of 
operation associated with them had the distribution as given in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Distribution of number of incidents for the incident with cause ‘other’ 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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Another pocket of data that was closely looked at was the incidents related to process 
units. There were a total of 800 incidents in this category. There was not sufficient 
information on these incidents, but 27% of these incidents were identified to be 
occurring in 3 major units of refinery processes as given below: 
• Sulfur Recovery Units – this included releases of hydrogen sulfide and sulfur 
oxides 
• Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Units – this included releases of nitrogen dioxide 
and nitrogen trioxide 
• Coking Units – this included releases of hydrogen sulfide and sulfur oxides 
 
A distribution of the number of incidents in the three units of refinery processes is given 
in Figure 9. 
 
 
Unkown
73%
Fluidized Catalytic 
Cracking Units
8%
Coking Units
4%
Sulfur Recovery 
Units
15%
 
Figure 9.  Distribution of number of incidents related to process unit upsets. 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
 
Nine chemicals most released into the air in all these incidents in the database were 
analyzed, and an average amount of each chemical released from those incidents is given 
in Table 2 along with the reportable quantities of these chemicals as given by the code of 
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federal regulations [14]. From a total of 7,265 incidents in the database, the amount of 
chemical released into the environment was not mentioned in 2,097 incidents. 
 
Table 2:  Average released amount of chemicals along with reportable quantities 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002)               
Chemical released 
Amount 
(lbs) 
Reportable 
Quantities (lbs) 
Benzene 4765 10 
Butadiene 2333 10 
Ammonia 7896 100 
Chlorine 864 10 
Xylene 2899 100 
Hydrogen Sulfide 162 10 
Acrolein 5.4 1 
Nitrogen Oxides 425 10 
Sulfur Oxides 3842 100 
 
 
Consequences of all the incidents mentioned in the database were also closely examined 
and a distribution of the consequences is given in Figure 10. The majority were chemical 
releases into the air followed by spilling of chemical on land. Overflowing of a chemical 
from a storage vessel, drum etc. was also an effect that led to spilling eventually.  
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Figure 10.  Distribution of number of incidents by consequence. 
 (Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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All the analysis done so far in this study is based on finding the distribution of incidents, 
taking one of the attributes of an incident at a time into consideration. Data mining helps 
further to relate two or more attributes at a time, and quantifies the findings which can be 
used in a different arena. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DATA MINING RESULTS 
 
Data mining methodologies of decision rees and association rules were applied to the 
NRC, harris county, 1990 to 2002 incidents. A detailed description of the results, and 
further their applicability to modification of probabilities of failures of equipments is 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
6.1. Decision Trees Results 
 
Decision trees were applied to some of the attributes of NRC incident database. 
Considering incidents with certain consequences at a time and working backwards to 
find the incident cause and kind of equipment failure associated with those incidents, 
complete tree structures were created. These tree structures give the exact number of 
incidents in each category. A total of 143 incidents involved fires and explosions in the 
database. Consequence of the incident was taken as the primary variable and the incident 
cause and the type of equipment failure involved as the dependent variables. Decision 
tree algorithm worked out a tree as given in Figure 11, giving a complete distribution of 
incidents leading to fires and explosions. Similarly, a decision tree was created for all the 
91 incidents which led to injury in the database (Figure 12). 
 
Another attribute of the incident that was looked at was the variable, which gave the 
information about initiation of an incident, whether it was known to the facility from the 
very moment it started or it came to its notice after sometime. This variable was taken as 
the primary variable and type of equipment failure involved as the dependent variable.  
The decision tree algorithm gave the distribution of incidents that came to the attention 
of the facility later on, as given in Figure 13.  
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Figure 11. Decision tree for all the incidents leading to fires and explosions 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
Vandalism (1) 
Process Units     18 
Storage Vessel     14  
Unknown    11     
Heat Transfer Equipment      7 
Process Vessel       7 
Unclassified      7     
Rotating Equipment      3 
Flare Stack       2 
Separation Equipment      2 
Relief Equipment       1 
Pipes & Fittings       1  
Incidents with Fire/Explosion = 143 
Equipment Failure (53) 
Process Units    10     
Heat Transfer Equipment    10 
Storage Vessel      9     
Process Vessel       6 
Pipes & Fittings       6  
Rotating Equipment      5 
Electrical Equipment      4 
Flare Stack       1 
Relief Equipment       1 
Unknown       1     
CAUSE 
Unknown (73) Other (10) 
Storage Vessel                        6  
Pipes & Fittings                    2 
Unknown      1     
Unclassified      1     
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Incidents that led to injury = 91 
Equipment Failure (46) 
Storage Vessel  12 
Pipes & Fittings  11 
Process Vessel    6 
Process Units                       5 
Heat Transfer Equipment    3 
Rotating Equipment   2 
Hose     2 
Relief Equipment    2 
Unknown   2    
Unclassified                 1 
CAUSE 
Unknown (32) Human error (9) Dumping (1) 
Process Units    7 
Storage Vessel    7 
Process Vessel                     5 
Unknown   4    
Unclassified                         2 
Pipes & Fittings                   2 
Rotating Equipment             2 
 Heat Transfer Equipment    1 
Separation Equipment          1 
Relief Equipment                  1 
Storage Vessel              2  
Pipes & Fittings          1 
          
      
Pipes & Fittings                   2    
Storage Vessel                     2 
Process Vessel                     2 
Unclassified                         1 
Heat Transfer Equipment    1 
Hose                  1 
           
     
Other (3)  
Figure12. Decision tree for all the incidents leading to injuries 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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The distribution given in Figure 13 emphasizes that the type of equipments having 
higher number of incidents require better monitoring either through operators or 
automated systems. 
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 Figure 13.  Distribution of number of incidents which require better monitoring 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002). 
 
6.2. Association Rules Results 
 
Association rules were applied to type of equipment failure involved and twelve of the 
chemicals that were involved in the majority of the incidents. Figures 14, 15, and 16 
present the lift values of these combinations.  
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Figure 15 reveals that the lift value of acrolein releases involving process vessel failures 
is around 3.5. That means the probability that a process vessel will be involved in an 
acrolein incident is 3.5 times higher than the individual probability of process vessel 
incidents in the database.  
 
Similarly, the lift value of hose incidents in Figure 16 points out that the probability of 
hose incidents, in which oil is released, is 4.84 times higher than the individual 
probability of hose incidents in the database. Figures 14, 15 and 16 give indications of 
the vulnerability of types of equipment to the chemical involved in the process.  
 
6.3. Modification of Probability of Failures of Equipments 
 
The following paragraphs outline how the lift values can be used to modify the annual 
probability of failures of equipments. 
 
Background 
The expression for probability of failure of equipment or in other words reliability is 
given in equation 13 [28]: 
   ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−=−= ∑∞
=
−
2 !
)1(111)(
n
nn
t
n
ttefP λλλ         (13) 
where, 
 P (f)  is the failure probability 
 λ is the failure rate [failure/year] 
t  is the time of exposure 
n is an auxiliary variable 
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Figure 14. Lift values – part 1(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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Figure 15. Lift values – part 2 (Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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Figure 16. Lift values – part 3 (Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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When λ<<1, equation 13 is approximately equivalent to the following equation: 
 
       ( ) t
n
tt
n
nn
λλλ ≅
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+−− ∑∞
=2 !
()111       (14) 
 
The probability of failure can therefore be estimated as given in equation 15. Here λ 
represents the annual probability of failure. 
 
      tfP λ=)(           (15)  
 
With the limitation given in equation 14, lift values can be used to modify annual failure 
probabilities of equipments. The annual probability in these cases is represented by λ 
(failure rate). In literature the majority of failure rates consist of averaged data. 
Multiplying failure rates by lift values will produce an annual failure probability of 
equipment that also takes into account the chemical used in the process. 
 
The following two cases illustrate how the modification is done on the annual failure 
probabilities of equipments. 
 
Case-1  
A hose failure rate of 4 [failures/106 hours] is recommended by Green et. al [29], which 
is equivalent to 0.035 [failure/year]. For a set of chemicals, annual failure probabilities 
for hose are given in Table 3. The modified annual failure probability was calculated by 
multiplying the failure rate with the lift value.  
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Table 3. Modified hose annual failure probabilities 
Chemical Lift value Recommended annual failure probabilities 
Butadiene 0.23 0.008 
Xylene 1.32 0.046 
Acids 0.97 0.034 
Oils 4.84 0.169 
Process Water 0.71 0.025 
 
Case-2 
In NRC database, incidents related to components of equipments were determined. The 
following case presents recommended annual failure probabilities for gaskets for the 
different types of equipment. Figure 17 presents the lift values for gasket failures with 
chemicals involving Butadiene, Benzene, and Oils. 
 
The Rasmussen report [30] uses a failure rate of 2.3•10-4 for gaskets.  Table 4 consists of 
the modified annual failure probabilities for different types of equipment. The values are 
presented for three chemicals that were involved in most of the releases namely 
Butadiene, Benzene, and Oils. The lift values for gaskets with respect to these three 
chemicals are presented in Figure 17. 
 
6.4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Lift Values 
 
Lift values used in this study represent an elevation in probability of an incident of 
equipment with respect to a specific chemical used in the process as well. Lift values can 
help plant personnel to know about the areas of concern from incident archive. 
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Table 4. Modified gasket annual failure probabilities  
Equipment Type Butadiene[*10-4] Benzene [*10-4] Oils [*10-4] 
Electrical Equipment 0 0.04 4.3 
Pumps and Compressors 3.6 2.5 1.6 
Flare Stack 3.7 2.9 0.02 
Heat Transfer Equipment 3.2 4.7 0.05 
Hoses 0.5 0.04 11.1 
Process Units 2.7 2.6 0.02 
Process Vessels 4.3 3.5 0.04 
Separation Equipment 0.9 1.3 3.5 
Storage Vessels 1.3 1.9 5.1 
Pipes & Fittings 1.5 2.2 3.0 
Relief Equipment 5.1 2.3 0.04 
Figure 17: Gasket lift values for butadiene, benzene, and oils 
(Source: NRC, Harris County, 1990-2002) 
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On the other hand, in order to validate the results, it is necessary to verify that the values 
are based on a sufficient number of incidents. In the Harris County dataset, there are just 
six incidents present for the chemical acrylonitrile. Therefore, the lift values calculated 
on this basis will be misleading. The lift values calculated here are based on the fixed 
facility incidents in Harris County, US, for the period 1990 to 2002, given in the NRC 
database. More accurate values can be calculated by taking into account all the fixed 
facility incidents in the United States. 
  
Another dimension can be added to take advantage of lift values. Lift values can be used 
to develop a decision support platform giving lift values of chemical releases with 
certain equipment failures. This can serve as an important tool for the decision maker. A 
detailed description of the software platform with the explanation of database and user 
interactive forms developed in this study is given in Appendix – A. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Data mining can serve as an important tool to find interesting relationships among 
variables in incident databases. It is capable of handling extremely large datasets and 
results are easily interpreted. This study used the two methodologies of decision trees 
and association rules to find some patterns that were not evident using traditional 
statistical methods. 
 
Data mining has many other methodologies which if applied can help to better 
predict and model the systems which tend to break down more. Neural networks can 
be useful in other areas of process safety like data-driven monitoring processes. 
Clustering can be used to segregate data into different groups, which can be further 
analyzed. Further these patterns found by using data mining techniques can be used 
in developing a decision support platform for the decision maker. This platform is 
subject to change in its feature and use depending on the information available in the 
incident database and the analysis done. 
 
Lift values can be extended in its dimension and can be used to quantify more than 
two attributes of an incident database. This was not done in this study as the 
information available in the NRC database was limited. 
 
One of the most time consuming process to apply data mining is integrating, 
cleaning, and transforming data from unstructured text. Incident databases contain 
mostly unstructured text which contains the explanation about incidents. Text mining 
one of the techniques of data mining can be used to convert unstructured text into 
structured data. Once structured data is obtained, it can be further categorized by 
using a set of algorithms. Text miner a module of SAS Inc. can perform text mining 
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making use of a dictionary of keywords. Compiling a dictionary of keywords used in 
the incident databases is one of the accomplishing tasks. 
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APPENDIX A 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
 
A.1. Introduction 
 
With the advent of computers and development of computational power over the years, 
decision support system (DSS) came into existence in the 1970s. Initially, it was used in 
operations research and financial analysis. It is different from the use of computers in 
recordkeeping and transaction processing, and basically involves a high level of 
interaction between the user and the machine, in order to have an effective system [31]. 
 
Decision support systems can be useful in the field of process safety. It can make the 
existing systems to function better, rather than relying on a single human expert. 
Decision support systems developed for automated HAZOP analysis in batch processes 
[32, 33] and real time fault diagnosis [34] can help in determining abnormal situations. 
In a similar approach, a simple decision support platform is developed in this study 
based on NRC data using the lift values of chemicals and equipment. These lift values 
can give an indication of susceptibility of using a particular chemical with an equipment, 
and can help the decision maker to make alternative choices if possible. In case of 
nonexistence of an alternative, it can emphasize to monitor the process more closely. 
 
A.2. Software Program 
 
Software program developed in this study uses Visual Basic a product of Microsoft 
Corporation. The user interface consisting of a set of user interactive forms in Microsoft 
access is developed; it uses the following tables as the database:  
• Equipment Table – this includes the list of groups of equipment in the NRC 
database 
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• Chemical Table – this includes the twelve most released chemicals in the 
database 
• Lift Value Table- this includes the lift values of different chemicals 
corresponding to different equipment 
 
There are 3 user interactive forms given below: 
• Main Form – this form has the linked menus to which a user can go, it includes 
options like equipment lift values, component lift values, and also it has the 
option of closing down the application. A snapshot of the form is given in Figure 
19. 
• Equipment form – this includes the two drop down menus for selecting the type 
of chemical and the kind of equipment failure involved. Once the user selects 
both of the drop down menus, lift values corresponding to that chemical and 
equipment failure is retrieved from the database and displayed in a text box. A 
snapshot of the form is given in Figure 20. 
• Component form- this form is exactly in the same form as the equipment form 
and retrieves the lift values for the chemical and the component of equipment 
selected by the user. A snapshot of the form is given in Figure 21. 
 
Programming Details 
Data Access Object 
Microsoft Data Access Objects (DAO) is a collection of objects that can control a 
database from any application that supports Visual Basic for Applications, including 
Microsoft Access, Excel, and Visual Basic. DAO objects can represent the structure of 
the database and even the data itself.   
DAO can be useful in doing the following functions: 
                                                                                                                                   64                                  
     
• Manipulate tables by changing the design, querying, and indexing.  
• Change the data in the database by adding, deleting, and appending 
• It also helps in retrieving the data  
• Linking different tables and manipulating data 
 
In developing this software application, DAO object that was extensively used was 
Record set. Record set represents the set of records in a table, query etc. ‘Move next’ one 
of the properties of record set was extensively used in this application to find the exact 
chemical and equipment as selected by the user in the drop down menus. 
 
The algorithm of the software application is described below: 
START 
Step – 1:  
• As the user opens the Application named ‘TEST’, the main form opens up. 
This gives the option of going into different menus of equipment form, 
component form, or exiting the application 
      Step -2: 
• Once the user is in either of the form, the equipment or the component form, 
the basic functionality remains the same. Here the user has to select the 
chemical and the equipment type from the drop down menus. 
      Step- 3: 
• Once the chemical and equipment is selected, lift table is accessed and the 
corresponding lift value of the chemical and equipment selected by the user is 
displayed in the text box by searching through the whole table.  
END 
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The main code that was written in Visual Basic is presented below (Figure 18). 
 
GLOBAL DECLARATIONS 
Dim Chemical_Name As String 
Dim Equipment_Name As String 
 
MAIN PROGRAM BODY 
 
‘This function retrieves the chemical name entered by the user 
Private Sub CHEMICALCOMBO_Change() 
Chemical_Name = CHEMICALCOMBO.Text 
If CHEMICALCOMBO.Text = "" Then 
MAINTEXTBOX.SetFocus 
MAINTEXTBOX.Text = "" 
Else 
check_equipment 
End If 
End Sub 
 
‘This is the main function which opens the record set, does manipulations required for 
the functionality and sends and receives variables to other functions 
Sub Main_Function() 
Dim dbSales As DAO.Database 
Dim rst1 As DAO.Recordset 
Dim rst12 As DAO.Recordset 
 
Figure 18. Visual basic code 
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Dim rstMain As DAO.Recordset 
Dim rst13 As DAO.Recordset 
Set dbMain = DBEngine(0)(0) 
 
‘This will create a table-type Recordset. 
Set rst1 = dbMain.OpenRecordset("LIFT_LOOKUP") 
Set rst12 = dbMain.OpenRecordset("CAUSE_LOOKUP") 
Do While rst1!CHEMICAL <> Chemical_Name 
rst1.MoveNext 
Loop 
Do While rst1!EQUIPMENT <> Equipment_Name 
rst1.MoveNext 
Loop 
MAINTEXTBOX.SetFocus 
MAINTEXTBOX.Text = rst1!L_VALUE 
Do While rst12!CHEMICAL <> Chemical_Name 
rst12.MoveNext 
Loop 
Do While rst12!EQUIPMENT <> Equipment_Name 
rst12.MoveNext 
Loop 
Set rst13 = dbMain.OpenRecordset("Graph") 
For x = 1 To 6 
rst13.Edit 
rst13!NUMBER1 = rst12!Number_2 
 
Figure 18. Continued 
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rst13.Update 
rst12.MoveNext 
rst13.MoveNext 
Next x 
End Sub 
 
‘This function checks the table of equipments 
Sub check_equipment() 
EQUIPMENTCOMBO.SetFocus 
Equipment_Name = EQUIPMENTCOMBO.Text 
If EQUIPMENTCOMBO.Text = "" Then 
MAINTEXTBOX.SetFocus 
MAINTEXTBOX.Text = "" 
Else 
Main_Function 
End If 
End Sub 
 
‘This function retrieves the equipment name entered by the user 
Private Sub EQUIPMENTCOMBO_Change() 
Equipment_Name = EQUIPMENTCOMBO.Text 
If EQUIPMENTCOMBO.Text = "" Then 
MAINTEXTBOX.SetFocus 
MAINTEXTBOX.Text = "" 
Else 
Check_Chemical 
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End If 
End Sub 
 
‘This function checks the table of chemicals 
Sub Check_Chemical() 
CHEMICALCOMBO.SetFocus 
Chemical_Name = CHEMICALCOMBO.Text 
If CHEMICALCOMBO.Text = "" Then 
MAINTEXTBOX.SetFocus 
MAINTEXTBOX.Text = "" 
Else 
Main_Function 
End If 
End Sub 
 
‘This function quits the application 
Private Sub Command6_Click() 
On Error GoTo Err_Command6_Click 
    DoCmd.Close 
Exit_Command6_Click: 
    Exit Sub 
Err_Command6_Click: 
    MsgBox Err.Description 
    Resume Exit_Command6_Click 
End Sub 
 
Figure 18.Continued 
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Figure 19. Main form 
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Figure 20. Equipment form 
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Figure 21. Component form
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